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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2000). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(b) (2001). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue before this court is whether the trial court correctly concluded 
that res judicata barred Jay Busch (Respondent) from arguing that the Decree of 
Divorce ordering him to pay the second mortgage on the family home was in lieu 
of alimony. "A trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an action 
'presents a question of law.'" Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT 
App 230,^5, 986 P.2d 748 (quotations and citation omitted), affd and modified by 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. This court 
'"review[s] such questions for correctness, according no particular deference to 
the trial court."5 Macris, 1999 UT App 230 at f 5 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cindy A. Busch (Petitioner) and Respondent were divorced in January of 
2000. As a result of the Decree of Divorce, Respondent was ordered to pay child 
support, alimony, and relevant to this case pay and hold Petitioner harmless from 
the second mortgage on the family home. Respondent has repeatedly failed to 
honor these obligations. Petitioner has attempted to collect on these debts since 
the Decree of Divorce. After multiple proceedings in the trial court, Respondent 
sought refuge in the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Utah 
(Bankruptcy Court) seeking to discharge all his obligations, including those 
resulting from the Decree of Divorce. The Bankruptcy Court, exercising its 
concurrent jurisdiction, refused to discharge the second mortgage debt finding the 
debt to be in the form of child support, and therefore non-dischargeable. 
The Course of the Proceedings 
Having failed to have his debt discharged by the Bankruptcy Court, 
Respondent filed a Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation in the trial 
court. Respondent asked the trial court to hold that the portion of the Decree of 
Divorce requiring him to pay the second mortgage on the family home was in the 
nature of alimony. Respondent's argument was that if the payment was in the 
nature of alimony, the obligation terminated upon Petitioner's remarriage. 
Disposition of the Court Below 
The trial court domestic commissioner recommended an order denying the 
attempt to seek clarification and held that the Bankruptcy Court had previously 
ruled that the obligation to pay the second mortgage was in the nature of support 
for the parties' minor child, and therefore Respondent's motion was barred by the 
application of the principles of res judicata. Respondent filed an objection to the 
commissioner's recommendation. Judge Lubeck, after hearing, overruled 
Respondent's objection and denied his motion for clarification. It is from this 
order that Respondent now appeals. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced on January 14, 2000. (R. 
141-45). 
2. The Decree of Divorce contained the following language relevant to 
this appeal: 
4. Respondent is ordered to pay child support in the sum of $524.66 
per month pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
10. The Respondent is order[ed] to pay the Petitioner $1,100 per 
month alimony for a term equal to the length of the marriage, which 
is thirteen (13) years and (11) months from the date of entry of this 
Decree. 
11. Respondent will assume and pay and hold Petitioner harmless 
from . . . the second mortgage on the parties' home. 
(R. 142-144). 
-* 
3- Respondent has repeatedly and willfully failed to make his child 
support, alimony, and second mortgage payments. (R. 222-23, 378-79).l 
4. Petitioner has brought numerous motions before the trial court and 
the trial court has repeatedly ordered Respondent to make these payments and has 
found Respondent in contempt. (R. 222-23, 378-81).2 
5. Respondent filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy on July 28, 
2000. (R. 462). 
6. Petitioner filed a proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court seeking to 
have the debt owed to her by Respondent declared to be non-dischargeable by that 
court. (R. 487-92). 
7. Respondent filed an objection to the proof of claim. (R. 489-94). 
8. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing regarding Respondent's 
objection to Petitioner's proof of claim. (R. 489). 
9. Respondent argued to the Bankruptcy Court that the payments on the 
second mortgage were in the nature of alimony, and as Petitioner was then 
remarried, Respondent was no longer obligated to continue making the payments. 
(R. 474-75). 
10. The Bankruptcy Court, ruling from the bench, held that the 
payments on the second mortgage were in the nature of support for the parties' 
1
 The later of these two Orders was later set aside by the Bankruptcy Court 
because of the automatic stay provision of federal bankruptcy law. (R. 462-64). 
2
 See Footnote 1. 
A 
minor child and that the second mortgage was therefore non-dischargeable. (R. 
721:13, Tab 1:4).3 
11. The Bankruptcy Court also ruled that Respondent's obligation to pay 
the second mortgage would continue as a priority non-dischargeable debt until the 
parties' minor child's eighteenth birthday. (R. 721:Tab 1:4). 
12. Petitioner submitted an order4 to the Bankruptcy Court, as instructed 
in the oral ruling of the Bankruptcy Court, which contains the following language 
relevant to this appeal: 
With respect to Debtor's objections to claim #7 and in view of the 
foregoing Ruling, the Court applies Debtor's objection to claim #8 
and finds as follows: 
a. The Debtor was obligated by provision of the Divorce 
Decree to satisfy and hold Cindy Busch harmless from the 
obligation created by the second mortgage on the parties' 
marital residence. 
b. The parties had a minor child that lived in the custody 
of Cindy Busch. Cindy Busch was not able to pay the second 
mortgage and provide a home for the child without Jay Busch 
assuming responsibility for the second mortgage. 
c. The obligation of Jay Busch to pay the second 
mortgage had the [ejffect of providing support for the minor 
child and under the precedent of Sylvester, (Sylvester v. 
Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989), the 
3
 Respondent concedes in his Statement of Facts that this was the ruling of the 
Bankruptcy Court. See Appellant's Opening Brief 3-4. However, Respondent, 
while challenging the oral ruling of the Bankruptcy Court and its effect, never 
submitted a transcript of the hearings before the Bankruptcy Court or a transcript 
of its ruling to the trial court. 
4
 Petitioner, in another proceeding currently pending before Bankruptcy Court has 
recently become aware that this order was never signed by Judge Clark. However, 
this order, although unsigned, represents a final determination by the Bankruptcy 
Court outlining the relevant factors considered by the Bankruptcy Court. For the 
reasons argued below, this court should consider this order in its determination of 
the appeal, in addition to the oral ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. 
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obligation is in the nature of support and entitled to priority 
status in the bankruptcy. 
(R. 490-91). 
13. On March 22, 2001, Respondent filed his Motion for Order 
Clarifying Nature of Obligation in the present case. This motion did not contain a 
transcript of the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court or otherwise cite any portion of 
the proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court beyond a summary of the holding. 
(R. 465-467). 
14. Respondent's motion stated in part: 
[Respondent respectfully requests that the Court issue its Order 
clarifying that [Respondent's obligation to pay the second mortgage 
was in the nature of alimony which terminated upon [Petitioner's 
remarriage. Respondent further requests this Court's specific 
determination that respondent's obligation is not "in the nature of 
child support." 
(R. 466-67). 
15. Petitioner filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's 
Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation, which included the above-cited 
order submitted to the Bankruptcy Court. (R. 473-509). 
16. Commissioner Michael S. Evans conducted a hearing on the motion 
on April 24, 2001. (R. 567-68). At this hearing both parties presented oral 
argument relating to the issue of res judicata and the proceedings before the 
Bankruptcy Court, however, neither party introduced transcripts of the Bankruptcy 
Court proceedings. (R. 721:2-10, 12-13). 
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17. In this hearing, the respondent again asked Commissioner Evans to 
specifically find that the obligation was not in the nature of child support. (R. 
721:12-13). 
18. Commissioner Evans entered a recommendation that Respondent's 
Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation be denied as it was previously 
ruled upon the Bankruptcy Court. (R. 568); see also Addendum 1, attached to 
Appellant's Opening Brief.5 
19. Commissioner Evans also stated the same question was before both 
courts with concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. (R. 721:17). 
20. Respondent filed an objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendation on May 2, 2001. (R. 525-26). Again, this objection did not 
contain any portion of the proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court. 
21. Petitioner filed a reply memorandum in support of the 
Commissioner's ruling. (R. 527-28). 
22. The trial court held a hearing on the objection on August 14, 2001. 
(R. 690-91, 721:Tabl). 
23. At the hearing both parties again presented argument regarding the 
proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court. (R. 721 :Tab 1:1-16). 
5
 The name of the order being reviewed is actually entitled Order on Defendant's 
Motion to Clarify Decree & Plaintiffs Motion to Defer Her Obligation to 
Defendant's Equity Until He Has Satisfied the Second Mortgage. The 
Commissioner heard both arguments at the same hearing, however, Respondent 
does not challenge that portion of the Order relating to Plaintiffs Motion. 
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24. The trial court overruled Respondent's objections, thereby denying 
Respondent's motion and sustaining the Commissioner's Recommendation. (R. 
691, 721:Tab 1:16); see also Addendum 2, attached to Appellant's Opening Brief. 
25. The Order on Defendant's Motion to Clarify Decree contains the 
following language: 
1. The Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court exercised its 
concurrent jurisdiction in the Defendant's bankruptcy case and 
found that the Defendant's obligation to pay the second mortgage 
was a debt that was in the nature of support and was therefore non-
dischargeable. 
2. In view of that ruling it is the opinion of this Court that the 
issue now sought be brought before this Court in Defendant's 
Motion, is, in fact, Res Judicata because of Judge Clark's ruling on 
the same issue. 
3. The Court therefore declines to rule further on the matter. 
4. The Defendant's Motion to Clarify the Decree is therefore 
denied. 
(R. 568); Addendum 1, attached to Appellant's Opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent concedes the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. However, 
Respondent argues that the trial court erred because the issue presented by his 
Motion was distinct from the issues presented to the Bankruptcy Court. This 
argument fails for two reasons. First, the identical factual issues were addressed in 
both proceedings, namely the nature of Respondent's obligation to pay the second 
mortgage on the hom£ This is evidenced by Respondent request that the trial 
court specifically rule in direct contradiction to the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. 
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This is also clear from the language of the order of the Bankruptcy Court, which 
although unsigned, represents the final determination by the Bankruptcy Court on 
the merits of this case. 
Second, although the Respondent argues that he presented two technically 
distinct claims, the factual issues remain identical as is evidenced by both the oral 
ruling and order of the Bankruptcy Court. Federal and Utah State law both require 
an examination of the same facts by both a bankruptcy court and a state trial court. 
These courts have concurrent jurisdiction over both bankruptcy matters and related 
civil matters. In the present case, the Bankruptcy Court properly examined all 
relevant facts, including the Decree of Divorce, in its determination of 
Respondent's obligation. 
Finally, Respondent failed to provide an adequate record to the trial court 
or this court that the Bankruptcy Court did not review the same issue. This court 
has held that in "the absence of 'an adequate record, we must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below,"' American Interstate Mortgage Corp. v. 
Edwards, 2002 UT App 16,1f30 n.3, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (citation omitted), or, 
as applied to this case, the regularity of the proceedings before the Bankruptcy 
Court. Assuming the regularity of those proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court 
properly exercised its concurrent jurisdiction and found the second mortgage 
payment to be in the nature of child support and not alimony. Therefore, 
Respondent cannot relitigate this issue in state court. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
A. BOTH ISSUE PRECLUSION AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BAR 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO CLARIFY. 
1. The issue raised in the Bankruptcy Court is identical to that 
raised in the trial court. 
Respondent raises only one issue on appeal, specifically that the same 
"precise" issue was not raised before both the Bankruptcy Court and the trial 
court. Respondent argues the Bankruptcy Court decided, solely on federal law, 
that the obligation to pay the second mortgage on the family home was in the 
nature of child support. He then argues that he asked the trial court to determine 
under Utah law that the second mortgage payment was in the nature of alimony, 
which should have terminated upon Petitioner's remarriage. However, the trial 
court correctly determined that the same issue was involved in both cases, namely 
whether the obligation created by the Decree of Divorce was in nature of child 
support. 
On its face, Respondent's motion sought a determination of the exact same 
issue as that presented to the Bankruptcy Court. Respondent's motion sought, in 
part, the "specific determination that respondent's obligation is not 'in the nature 
of child support.'" (R. 467). It is undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court found that 
the second mortgage payment was in the nature of support for the minor child. 
This fact is illustrated by the Bankruptcy Court's language limiting Respondent's 
obligation to pay this debt to the child's minority. (R. 721 :Tab 1:4). 
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This is also clear from the language of the Bankruptcy Court order, which 
specifically noted that Respondent's obligation to pay the second mortgage was in 
the form of support for the minor child. (R. 492-93). As referenced above, this 
order, in addition to the oral ruling, evidences the final judgment of the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
Although not raised in his opening brief, it is anticipated that Respondent 
will argue that this court should not consider the order. This order was properly 
submitted to Judge Clark for signature, However, Respondent voluntarily 
dismissed his bankruptcy pnKvrdiiig prior to the signing of the order and it 
became moot, and Respondent has since filed again. (R. 721:Tab 1:9-10.) 
Therefore, Respondent actions in the Bankruptcy Court prevented the signing of 
the order. In In re Docteroff, 133 F.3d 210, 215 (3rd Cir. 1997), the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that collateral estoppel prevented Doctoroff 
from relitigating an issue presented to the district court. Doctoroff filed for 
bankruptcy invoking the automatic stay provision, preventing the entry of a final 
judgment and later argued that the district court decision was not final. See id. at 
215. The court stated: "Doctoroff... prevented the judgment from becoming 
final. By filing the Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and invoking the automatic 
stay, he prevented the district court from holding a trial on damages and entering a 
final judgment." Id. at 216. Similarly, in the present case, the Bankruptcy Court 
instructed Petitioner's counsel to prepare the cited order, but the order remained 
unsigned after Respondent's voluntary dismissal of his bankruptcy petition. 
11 
Additionally, Respondent never presented the trial court with a copy of any 
objection made to the order filed with the Bankruptcy Court, and has waived any 
argument that this was in fact not the holding of the Bankruptcy Court.6 Further, 
as is argued below, the obligation to have provided a full accounting of the 
proceedings of the Bankruptcy Court falls on Respondent as he disputes whether 
the "identical issue" was presented to that court as was presented to the trial court 
and in the absence of such a record this court assumes the regularity of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. See American Interstate Mortgage Corp. v. Edwards, 
2002 UT App 16,1f30 n.3, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 20; see also State v. Noren, 704 
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985). 
In sum, both the oral ruling and the order indicate that the identical issue 
was presented to both courts. In order for the trial court to find that the second 
mortgage was, in fact, in the nature of alimony, it would by necessity, be forced to 
find that obligation was not in the nature of support for the minor child. This 
determination necessarily requires that the trial court revisit the issue of whether 
the obligation was in the nature of child support. Therefore, the trial court would 
conduct the same factual determination that had been previously conducted by the 
Bankruptcy Court. See In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1993) 
6
 Respondent first raised the argument before Judge Lubeck that the order was not 
signed, that Judge Clark would never sign the order as it was drafted, and that 
Respondent had filed a motion to have the order reconsidered. (R. 721:Tab 1:14). 
However, nothing relating to this "reconsideration" was submitted to the trial 
court. 
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("Whether an obligation to a former spouse is actually in the nature of support is a 
factual question . . . . " ) . 
2. The presentation of distinct legal claims does not preclude the 
application of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. 
Respondent argues that the issue was not identical, because the claims 
presented to the two courts were distinct because the state and federal courts rely 
on distinct law in making these determinations. Respondent is correct that the 
nature of the "obligation arising out of a divorce [decree]... is a matter of federal 
bankruptcy law." Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1666 (10th Cir. 1989). 
However, "[I]t is well settled that issue preclusion prevents relitigation of the same 
issue even if the claims for relief in the two actions are different." Sew v. 
Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1995). In Mannes-
Vale, Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The applicability of collateral estoppel does not depend on whether the claims 
asserted are identical, but, in part, on whether the actual issue litigated and 
determined in the initial action is the same factual issue as that subsequently raised 
in the later claim." Nevertheless, Respondent concludes that the issue is therefore 
"not precisely the same." He cites Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 
P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988) for its holding that when different facts are relevant 
to distinct issues, issue preclusion does not apply. This argument fails for two . 
reasons. First, as noted above, the same factual issues are being presented to the 
13 
trial court: as were presented to the Bankruptcy Court. Second, Respondent's 
argument ignores the concurrent jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and the trial 
courts to review the same claims and underlying facts under both state and federal 
law. 
a. The same factual determinations were before both courts. 
As related above, the issue in this case turns on the nature of Respondent's 
obligation to pay the second mortgage payments. The Decree of Divorce provides 
for a monthly amount of both child support and alimony. The Decree also 
provided that the Respondent "pay and hold Petitioner harmless from the marital 
debt . . . and the second mortgage on the parties' home." (R. 143-44). Respondent 
filed for bankruptcy and sought to have certain debts discharged. 
In order to determine whether the Respondents debt could be discharged, 
the Bankruptcy Court had to make a factual determination as to the nature of the 
obligation. As noted, the obligation under federal bankruptcy law owed to a 
former spouse is a factual determination. See In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 721 
(10th Cir. 1993). In the present case, the Bankruptcy Court had access to the 
Decree of Divorce, which provided the basis for Petitioner's claims against 
Respondent in the Bankruptcy Court. Second, the Bankruptcy Court may properly 
consider whether the " parties had a minor child at the time of the divorce and 
[Respondent] had substantially more income than [Petitioner]." Sylvester v. 
Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1666 (10th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit also noted its 
14 
approval of findings demonstrating that the actual effect of the payment allowed a 
former spouse to maintain her home. See id. In the present case, the Bankruptcy 
Court similarly ruled that the support should continue through the minority of the 
parties' child. (R.721:4). This ruling is clearly based on a factual recognition by 
the Bankruptcy Court that the minor child was in need of support and 
Respondent's payment of the second mortgage provided that support. Finally, the 
parties had been divorced for over a year at the time of the hearing. This is a 
factor a Bankruptcy Court may consider when determining whether the obligation 
is support. See id. (stating that a relevant factor in determining the nature of an 
obligation is "whether the obligation to make monthly payments . . . terminates on 
remarriage or death"). Aware of Petitioner's remarriage, the Bankruptcy Court 
upheld the obligation as child support, again indicating that the mortgage payment 
was not in lieu of alimony. In sum, the Bankruptcy Court, examining all the 
relevant factors of this case, found the obligation to be in the nature of support of 
the minor child. 
These same facts would have been examined by the trial court if it had not 
ruled that res judicata applied. The trial court would have begun with an 
examination of a the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. In Culbertson v. B of County Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 
108,Tfl7, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, the Supreme Court interpreted the effect of an 
order. The supreme court then stated: "We come to this conclusion by looking 
first to the language of the order . . . . " Id As noted, the Decree of Divorce was 
1S 
submitted to the Bankruptcy Court during the bankruptcy proceedings. The 
remainder of the Decree of Divorce indicates the factors considered by the trial 
court at the time of divorce, which would have been examined by the trial court on 
Respondent's Motion to Clarify. The trial court noted the disparate incomes 
between the parties and granted custody of the minor child to Petitioner. (R. 135, 
142-43). This is the same factor that the Bankruptcy Court may consider. Second, 
the Respondent was given a lien on the home, which was tied in part to the age of 
the minor child, (R. 144), as was the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. Finally, the 
Bankruptcy Court made a specific finding that the maintenance of the home was 
for the benefit of the minor child, which is also a factor the trial court would have 
had to consider in this case. 
Respondent also argues that the Bankruptcy Court ruling is distinct from 
the relief he requested because "under Utah law child support is determined by the 
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 [(2000)]" and the Bankruptcy 
Court found the second mortgage payment to be in the form of child support. 
Respondent's argument is incorrect and fails to account for the equitable power of 
the state courts to divide property depending on the facts of the particular case. 
See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (2000) ("When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, debts or obligations, and parties."). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court, 
examining the facts outlined above, made the determination that the second 
16 
mortgage payment was in the nature of child support and this determination does 
not conflict with child support guidelines outlined by section 78-45-7.14. 
In sum, the trial court would have considered the same factual evidence as 
was presented to the Bankruptcy Court. Therefore, as the same factual issues were 
being presented in both cases, the trial court properly denied Respondent's motion. 
b. The Bankruptcy Court has concurrent jurisdiction over related civil 
matters. 
Respondent also fails to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
Bankruptcy Court and the trial court. Respondent argues that the Bankruptcy 
Court could only decide issues relating to his obligation under federal law and 
could not make a determination regarding his continuing obligation under state 
law. "Clearly, a State Court of competent jurisdiction has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the Bankruptcy Court in determining the nature of an obligation created by a 
divorce decree." In re Smith, 125 B.R. 630, 631 (Bankr. E.D. Oklahoma 1991) 
(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that "the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah has jurisdiction over the appellant's 
bankruptcy proceedings and over all related civil matters as well. Rogers v. 
Rogers, 671 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1983); see also 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(b) (2001) 
("Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a 
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to 
17 
cases under title 11.") (emphasis added). The trial court explicitly acknowledged 
in its order that the Bankruptcy Court had exercised its concurrent jurisdiction. 
(R. 568). 
In the present case, Respondent sought a discharge of his obligations under 
the Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, Petitioner's attempt to enforce the Decree of 
Divorce and collect on the judgments awarded her was a related civil matter and 
the Bankruptcy Court had concurrent jurisdiction to interpret the nature of 
Respondent's obligations under the Decree. 
The law is clear that state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction to determine issues raised under 11 U.S.C.A. § 
523(a)(5) [W]here the determination of dischargeability has 
been brought before a bankruptcy court, that court may review a 
judgment, decree or order which is claimed to be in the nature of 
alimony, maintenance and support, and determine the nature of the 
obligation imposed." 
Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah 1984). Here, the Bankruptcy 
Court had authority to examine the Decree of Divorce and make a determination 
as to the nature of Respondent's obligation under federal and state law. Although, 
the question was raised and addressed in a bankruptcy setting, the determination 
was made by a competent court with jurisdiction over the Decree of Divorce. The 
Bankruptcy Court, having examined all the relevant facts relating to Respondent's 
obligation to pay the second mortgage on the family home, properly determined 
that the obligation was in the form of support of the minor child. Therefore, the 
trial court correctly determined that Respondent's Motion to Clarify was seeking a 
18 
determination of an issue, which had been previously decided by the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
B. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ADEQUATE RECORD THIS COURT 
MUST PRESUME THE VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS. 
Respondent concedes the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. Specifically, he 
recognizes that court held that his obligation to pay the second mortgage was in 
the nature of child support. (R. 721:4 and Appellant's Opening Brief 8-9). 
Respondent filed his motion with the trial court seeking to have the specific 
finding that the obligation was in the nature of alimony and not for the support of 
the minor child. However, Respondent failed to present the trial court with an 
adequate record of the bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, Respondent presented an 
oral argument of what those proceedings entailed to the trial court. In his brief, 
Respondent cites to the hearing conducted before the trial court and the 
representations of Petitioner's attorney. In that hearing, Petitioner's counsel 
recognized that the characterization of Respondent's obligation could not be 
termed in the same way as that "court would normally do." (R. 721:5). However, 
this representation does not affect the analysis above or what the proceedings 
entailed in the Bankruptcy Court. 
Respondent failed to introduce any transcripts, findings, or rulings from the 
bankruptcy proceedings to the trial court. In the absence of such a record, the trial 
court and this court must presume the regularity of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
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See Bevan v. J.H. Constr. Co.. Inc.. 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983) ("In the 
absence of a transcript, we assume the proceedings at trial were regular and proper 
and that the judgment was supported by competent and sufficient evidence."). 
Here the trial court was presented only an order submitted to the Bankruptcy 
Court, its ruling, and the representation of the parties, and properly determined 
that the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the identical issue raised by the Respondent. 
This court's recent decision in American Interstate Mortgage Corp. v. 
Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, is also instructive. In that 
case the trial court awarded the mortgage company attorney fees in the action 
before it as well as an earlier action. See id. at ^[1. The Edwards sought to have 
the award reversed arguing that in the earlier action the mortgage company failed 
to give them proper notice and was therefore not entitled to its claimed attorney 
fees. See id. at ^[29. This court "note[d] that as to any notice sent in the 1994 
Action and the attorney fees incurred therein, the Edwardses cannot claim error. 
We have no record regarding the 1994 Action beyond the judgment of the trial 
court in that case. In the absence of "an adequate record, we must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below." Id at f 30 n.3 (citation omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court similarly only had access to the ruling of 
the Bankruptcy Court. As noted above, the Bankruptcy Court had concurrent 
jurisdiction over the related civil matters including the interpretation of the Decree 
of Divorce. In the absence of a record before the trial court of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, this court must "assume the regularity" of the bankruptcy 
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proceedings and conclude that the Bankruptcy Court decision was based on 
sufficient evidence regarding the nature of Respondent's obligations. 
Accordingly, Respondent may not now challenge the conclusion of the 
Bankruptcy Court by arguing that the Bankruptcy Court did not properly 
determine the nature of his obligation to pay the second mortgage on the family 
home. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent argued to the Bankruptcy Court that his obligation to pay the 
second mortgage was in the nature of alimony and therefore dischargeable under 
bankruptcy law. After exercising its concurrent jurisdiction the Bankruptcy Court 
determined that the second mortgage payments were in the nature of support for 
the parties minor child. Respondent then filed a motion seeking a determination 
from the trial court that the mortgage payments were not support for the child, but 
rather were in lieu of alimony. The trial court properly recognized that the issue 
had been litigated in the Bankruptcy Court and denied the Respondent's motion 
and this court should affirm that decision. Additionally, Respondent failed to 
present this court or the trial court with an adequate record of the proceedings 
before the Bankruptcy Court. Accordingly, this court must assume the regularity 
of the proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court and affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
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